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Few grand strategies puzzle international relations scholars more than 
appeasement. Scholars have debated why states put their hopes in seemingly risky 
attempts to “buy off” foreign challengers ever since Neville Chamberlain 
unsuccessfully sought to mollify Adolf Hitler in the 1930s.1 Today, few analysts 
subscribe to the once-popular “guilty men” theory, which attributes appeasement 
to leaders’ personal failings.2 Instead, two general approaches delineate the 
contemporary study of appeasement. One suggests that states are most apt to 
appease a foreign challenger when facing multiple external threats.3 States, they 
argue, will sometimes attempt to mollify one foe in an effort to concentrate scarce 
resources against a more dangerous enemy; appeasement is the product of a logic 
                                                 
1 We define appeasement as a strategy of diplomatic concessions aimed at buying 
off a potential aggressor. It is a purposive strategy designed to achieve 
international security. See Stephen Rock, Appeasement in International Politics 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000), pp. 10-15. This point, that 
appeasement can be a credible tool for obtaining external security, is often 
overlooked. See Paul M. Kennedy, ‘The Tradition of Appeasement in British 
Foreign Policy 1865-1939’, British Journal of International Studies, 2:3 (1976), 
pp. 195-215; and Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The 
Historical Journal, 19:1 (1976), pp. 223-43. 
2 On the historiography of appeasement, see Patrick Finney, ‘The Romance of 
Decline: the Historiography of Appeasement and British National Identity’, 
electronic Journal of International History, 2000, 
http://www.history.ac.uk/ejournal/art1.html.  
3 Christopher Layne, ‘Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville 
Chamberlain’s Grand Strategy Revisited’, Security Studies, 17:3 (2008), pp. 397-
437; Daniel Treisman, ‘Rational Appeasment’, International Organization, 58:2 
(2004), pp. 345-73; and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 164-65.  
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of triage.4 The other stresses internal, rather than external, pressures. In these 
domestic politics accounts, powerful financial and export-oriented interests, 
worried about the economic and social costs of war, pressure national leaders to 
make diplomatic concessions in hopes of avoiding conflict.5 For these scholars, 
appeasement is less about prioritizing foreign threats than it is about placating 
kingmakers at home. 
In this article, we offer an alternative explanation for why states appease. 
We argue that the answer lies at the microfoundational level of individual leaders, 
where the twin pressures of statecraft and political leadership intersect. 
Governments are most likely to adopt a strategy of appeasement when their top 
leaders are severely cross-pressured: when demands for international security 
conflict sharply with domestic political priorities. Appeasers invariably hold 
power at times when national security is scarce; they cannot safely discount the 
risk of foreign aggression. Yet leaders who appease foreign aggressors are also 
                                                 
4 A related realist argument is that leaders will appease a dangerous foe as a 
temporary measure to “buy time” to build up their military power. See Norrin M. 
Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, ‘Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of 
British Appeasement in the 1930s’, International Security 33:2 (2008), pp. 148-
81; and Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 165. 
5 Alexander Anievas, ‘The International Political Economy of Appeasement: the 
Social Sources of British Foreign Policy during the 1930s’, Review of 
International Studies, 37:2 (2011), pp.601-29; Kevin Narizny, ‘The Political 
Economy of Alignment: Great Britain’s Commitments to Europe, 1905-39’, 
International Security 27:4 (2003), pp. 184-219; Scott Newton, Profits of Peace: 
The Political Economy of Appeasement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); and 
Sandra Halperin, War and Social Change: The Great Transformation Revisited 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chapter 7. 
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constrained domestically. Economic resources are limited, and leaders run high 
risks with the electorate (selectorate) if they fail to invest those resources at home. 
In the context of this specific political configuration, cross-pressured leaders will 
seek security on the cheap, with appeasement being one way out of this classic 
dilemma of statecraft - that is, a strategy to obtain an acceptable level of external 
security while at the same time catering to domestic exigencies. 
We test our argument about the salience of international threat and 
domestic politics against a detailed analysis of British appeasement in the 1930s. 
While Winston Churchill’s admonition at Fulton, Missouri that “there never was a 
war in history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just 
desolated such great areas of the globe” may be overstating the case,6 it is true 
that many scholars believe World War II could have been averted had 
Chamberlain acted decisively to contain German revanchism. As such, there is an 
intrinsic value in understanding Chamberlain’s calculus. Yet the Chamberlain 
case also offers a ‘hard test’ for our argument that appeasers are leaders who face 
incentives to invest resources on the home front. As head of the right-of-center 
Conservative party and a staunch opponent of socialism, it defies conventional 
wisdom to suggest that Chamberlain faced intractable pressures to invest in butter 
over guns.  Indeed, Chamberlain while Chancellor of the Exchequer had 
                                                 
6 James W. Muller, Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” Speech Fifty Years Later 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), p. 12. 
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advocated that the Conservatives fight the 1935 general election on the issue of 
national security, gaining for himself a reputation as something of a hawk on 
foreign policy.7 Once Chamberlain became Prime Minister in May 1937 at the 
head of a Conservative-dominated National Government with a huge 
parliamentary majority, why did he not beat a militarist path? We show that 
weighty domestic imperatives combined with geopolitical factors to shape 
Chamberlain’s decision to appease. 
The paper is organized into four sections. In the first section, we describe 
the general conditions under which politically self-interested leaders are most apt 
to appease a potential aggressor. The next section applies the model to the British 
case. We explain why Chamberlain saw political advantage in appeasement and 
why Chamberlain found it difficult to adopt a tougher stance toward Germany, 
while also taking care to highlight facets of the case that do not fit our model. In 
the third section, we briefly consider what would have been necessary for 
Chamberlain to abandon appeasement in favor of a more assertive balancing 
strategy, drawing on the comparative case of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to 
consider the counterfactual argument. Finally, we conclude by discussing 
implications for theorizing about appeasement and about how leaders make grand 
strategy more generally. 
                                                 
7 Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: Macmillan, 1946), pp. 
268-69; Nick Smart, Neville Chamberlain (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 204. 
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The political logic of appeasement 
 Appeasement occurs far more frequently in international politics than 
balance-of-power logic predicts.8  Most efforts to explain this “anomaly” have 
given pride of place to either the international or the domestic level of analysis. 
Few scholars have taken the analysis to the level of individual leaders.9 To some 
extent, this reflects a view widely held among contemporary international 
relations scholars that although individuals do matter from time to time, it is not 
possible to generalize about their behavior.10 
 We believe that this view is mistaken, and that our understanding of why 
states sometimes opt to appease their foes can be enhanced by starting from the 
level of individual statesmen, by viewing leaders as strategic actors who choose 
their policies (strategies) on the basis of political self-interest. By going to the 
                                                 
8 See Schroeder, ‘Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory’, International 
Security, 19:1 (1994), pp. 108-48; Rock, Appeasement. Recognition of this fact 
has given impetus to a well-developed neoclassical realist literature on the causes 
of appeasement and the related phenomenon of “under-balancing.” 
9 Some important exceptions include and Robert Jervis,  Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976); Barbara Rearden Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of 
Political Decision-Making (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and 
Triesman, ‘Rational Appeasement’. 
10 Again, there are important exceptions, although none address questions of 
grand strategy-making.  See, for example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and 
Randolph M. Siverson, ‘War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A 
Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability’, American 
Political Science Review, 89:4 (1995), pp. 841-55; Elizabeth N. Saunders, 
Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011); and Giacomo Chiozza and H.E. Goemans, Leaders and 
International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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microfoundational level, it is possible to take into account Realpolitik’s concern 
with international power and security and Innenpolitik’s emphasis on domestic 
interests and coalitions. Specifically, we model the ‘inputs’ of a leader’s political 
calculus as deriving from both the international and the domestic spheres, turning 
core realist and domestic politics insights about the structural determinants of 
appeasement into a parsimonious—and generalizable—explanatory model.11 In 
contrast to extant approaches, then, which tend to privilege a single level of 
analysis when modeling strategic choice, our approach posits geopolitical and 
internal forces as twin engines of statecraft, joint drivers of leaders’ strategic 
choices. In short, self-interested political leaders must, by virtue of their positions, 
respond to both international and domestic stimuli in relatively equal measure.12 
                                                 
11 For a fuller discussion of the model, see Peter Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy: 
Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011). 
12 To emphasize, we make no assumption that either international or domestic 
factors are preeminent. Our approach can thus be differentiated from both 
Innenpolitik and neoclassical realist approaches in that both international structure 
and domestic politics are modeled as truly independent variables. To the extent 
that Innenpolitikers incorporate international structure into their explanations of 
foreign policy, it is only as a conditioning force – an intervening variable. See, for 
example, Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2007), pp. 23-4. Neoclassical realist models of foreign policy 
also only pay attention to domestic politics as intervening variables. See Gideon 
Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics 51:1 
(1998), pp. 144-72. Our approach is more similar in spirit to that found in Robert 
D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 
International Organization 42:3 (1988), pp. 427-460. Like Putnam, we consider 
how international domestic pressures combine to produce policy – in his case, 
negotiating stratagems and international agreements.  Putnam does not extend this 
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Geopolitical slack 
 Leaders take geopolitics seriously for a simple reason: to do otherwise is 
to risk their reputations and their hold on political power. As Niccolo Machiavelli 
warned, “princes” who misjudge their state’s surroundings and capabilities 
jeopardize their hold on power. The unanticipated rise of a foreign challenger or 
the failure to take an old or new foe seriously can severely damage a leader’s 
reputation and credibility, at home as well as abroad. Failure or defeat in 
international affairs throws open the door to domestic opponents and would-be 
challengers to the throne. In short, demonstrating foreign policy competence 
matters. 
 How pressing is this performance constraint? It depends, we argue, on 
how much slack there is in the external environment. The term “slack” refers to a 
country’s room for maneuver in an international system in which power is 
distributed unevenly; it is measured by the intensity of the threat(s) that a country 
faces from foreign challengers.13 Leaders have greater geopolitical slack when 
their country faces no immediate threat to its physical security, and when the 
possibility of a rapid and adverse shift in the distribution of power is relatively 
                                                                                                                                     
intuition to the making of grand strategy and does not propose a theory of either 
geopolitical or domestic constraints. 
13 For a similar formulation of threat as a continuum, see Celeste A. Wallander 
and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Risk, Threat, and Security Insitutions’, in Helga 
Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander (eds), Imperfect 
Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), pp. 21-47. 
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low. Under such circumstances, decision-makers can treat the international 
environment as relatively benign, something that bears opportunity rather than 
portending risk. Leaders have little geopolitical slack when security is scarce and 
their state is exposed and vulnerable to foreign intimidation and aggression. In 
this situation, leaders are much more likely to find themselves compelled by their 
surroundings.  In particular, they have strong incentives to move proactively to 
check challengers and avoid adverse shifts in their geopolitical position that their 
publics might blame them for, and that both their domestic and foreign 
adversaries might exploit.14 
 Statesmen thus have self-interested reasons for thinking in geopolitical 
terms,15 especially when international conditions are unfavorable and the risk of 
strategic failure and domestic blame is great.  Almost invariably, leaders will look 
for ways to minimize their political exposure to hazardous international 
                                                 
14 Of course, the level of geopolitical slack in the international environment is not 
always obvious to contemporary actors or future analysts. Yet leaders and their 
foreign policy bureaucracies invariably produce assessments of the international 
scene when governing. For the purposes of our analysis, we rely upon a 
qualitative understanding of how leaders viewed the geopolitical situation at the 
time. 
15 This argument for why leaders respond to external stimuli differs from the 
assumption found in neoclassical realism that leaders respond to systemic 
imperatives first and foremost (even if via an imperfect “transmission belt”). See 
Jeffrey Taliaferro, Steven Lobell and Norrin Ripsman, ‘Introduction: Neoclassical 
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy’, in Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro (eds), 
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 4. 
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environments. How? Balancing is one possible response.16 It is a defensive 
strategy that involves efforts to prevent another state from exploiting the status 
quo. One form of balancing involves a leader’s efforts to build up his or her 
state’s military capabilities (“internal balancing”). Alternatively, a leader can try 
to diffuse the threat by pooling resources with other states through forming 
alliances (“external balancing”). 
 However, balancing is a comparatively expensive type of response, 
especially the internal variety. Wealth must be taxed, requisitioned or 
expropriated, and resources can be hard to extract from a resistant populace or 
legislature. In this regard, balancing strategies differ sharply from other status quo 
strategies such as appeasement or buckpassing whereby leaders rely on some 
other state to check potential aggressors.17  Appeasement and buckpassing require 
little in the way of taxation or conscription because they lean disproportionately 
on diplomatic means. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of appeasement, 
                                                 
16 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random 
House, 1979); Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987). 
17 On buckpassing, see Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: Britain, 
France, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1984); and Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, ‘Chain Gangs and Passed 
bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity’, International Organization, 
44:2 (1990), pp. 137-68. 
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but buckpassing is similar in that it seeks to “shirk” the costs of deterring (and 
possibly defeating) the potential aggressor.18  
 Which of these grand strategies, then, will leaders adopt at any given 
moment?  Realists have tended to focus on external considerations: Is the threat 
urgent? Are suitable allies available? Is another state willing to catch the buck? 
However, explanations that give pride of place to international circumstances are 
unhelpful for understanding why leaders sometimes prefer appeasement or 
buckpassing to internal balancing – that is, why leaders sometimes act contrary to 
balance-of-power logic.  Knowing how much geopolitical slack a leader has tells 
us something general about how he or she will act, but whether a leader will 
balance against or appease an external threat depends upon domestic as well as 
international circumstances. 
Guns versus butter 
 Leaders are not only statesmen; they also head up domestic coalitions or 
parties, the continued support of which depends in part on the leader’s ability to 
deliver valued goods to their constituents. Modern leaders do many things to gain 
domestic backing. They set national priorities, work for policies that create jobs, 
                                                 
18 We recognize that appeasement and buckpassing differ in important respects. 
What makes appeasement and buckpassing similar, however, is their shared goal 
of meeting an external threat at a reduced cost. 
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distribute contracts, provide subsidies and channel investments into projects that 
will benefit their supporters and strengthen their party’s claim to power. 
 One implication is that a leader’s ambition to pursue expensive balancing 
strategies depends in part upon whether the domestic constituencies whose 
support is essential to his or her hold on power have a sizable stake in investing in 
military strength, as opposed to domestic welfare. If so, expansive (and 
expensive) strategies for dealing with external threats are much easier to develop 
and implement. Frequently this is the case, but sometimes a leader’s party prefers 
butter to guns, even in the face of worsening international circumstances. In these 
instances, when supporters are reluctant to prioritize foreign policies that put a 
premium on military power, leaders can be expected to favor strategies that place 
less of a burden on domestic resources. To emphasize, this is not to say that 
leaders ever can disregard the risks posed by external threats, just that some 
leaders (those who head butter-oriented coalitions) are wont to favor grand 
strategies that place less of a financial burden on society than their counterparts 
who head guns-oriented blocs.19   
                                                 
19 This implication of our argument helps to further distinguish it from varieties of 
realism, which neglect domestic sources of the “national interest” and instead 
treat domestic politics as, at best, intervening variables that prevent the national 
interest from being acted upon. Of course, political parties are not monoliths; they 
are better seen as composites of blocs of interest groups and voters; how 
intensively leaders act in accordance with the preferences of their domestic 
coalitions depends partly on how united the coalitions are. Nor do all groups 
belong to just a single coalition.  Some special interest groups, especially 
 12 
  Beyond the distributional consequences of grand strategy, leaders are also 
mindful of how foreign policy decisions will play among the public at large. 
Especially in democracies, leaders must secure the political backing of not only 
partisans but also a decisive slice of the national electorate.20 Popular attitudes 
about taxes and nontax opportunity costs are thus important indicators of how 
much domestic latitude leaders have in making grand strategy.21  The more 
resistant the public is to new taxes and conscription, the higher the domestic 
political hurdles to mobilizing military power, and the more restrained leaders are 
likely to be in setting grand strategy. This means that foreign policies rarely are 
judged solely on their own merits.  Rather, leaders must also consider whether 
and how foreign policies will affect what they are trying to achieve domestically, 
something that is especially pertinent when it comes to foreign policies that 
threaten to expend sizable quantities of national resources. Generations of 
political economists have described this trade-off in stylized terms as the choice 
between guns and butter. Leaders must decide whether to invest the state’s 
                                                                                                                                     
industrial and financial interests, usually attempt to curry favor with multiple 
potential parties of power and even manipulate domestic opinion beyond 
membership of partisan coalitions; their influence can thus extend beyond merely 
comprising one of a leader’s several core constituencies. 
20 Even autocratic leaders must cater to the broad contours of the domestic 
political landscape, however. See Chiozza and Goemans, Leaders and 
International Conflict. 
21 On this point, see Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic 
Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), pp. 25-6. 
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resources in military build-up (guns) or to invest in domestically oriented policies 
and programs (butter).22 As a practical matter, the trade-off is rarely as unbending 
as modern economic texts portray it to be. Leaders can and often do invest in both 
guns and butter, relying on increased taxes or large budget deficits to reduce the 
severity of the trade-off. Still, the guns-versus-butter distinction is a useful 
reminder that leaders do not make grand strategy in a fiscal vacuum. As the 
famous American strategist Bernard Brodie put it, “Strategy wears a dollar 
sign.”23 
 How acute this guns-versus-butter trade-off is depends on many things: 
economic growth, administrative capacity, and domestic support for or opposition 
to the extractive policies that finance military spending.24 In times of plenty, 
conflicts over national priorities and budget outlays ease, and domestic politics 
becomes less zero-sum. Leaders who hold power at a time of economic crisis, by 
                                                 
22 This partly explains why empirical evidence of the trade-off between defense 
and welfare is inconsistent. For a useful review of the debate, see Aaron L. 
Friedberg, ‘The Political Economy of American National Strategy’, World 
Politics 41:3 (1989), pp. 387-406; and Steve Chan and Alex Mintz, Defense, 
Wealth, and Growth (London: Routledge, 1992).  
23 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1965). 
24 See Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987); Michael 
Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, ‘Toward a Realist Theory of 
State Action’, International Studies Quarterly, 33:4 (1989), pp. 457-74; Alan C. 
Lamborn, ‘Power and the Politics of Extraction’, International Studies Quarterly, 
27:2 (1983), pp. 125-46; and Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: 
Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998). 
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contrast, have fewer resources at their disposal and are thus more constrained. 
Diversionary war theory predicts that it is precisely under these conditions that 
leaders are most likely to resort to coercive diplomacy or war.25 Sometimes this 
prediction holds up. Yet leaders faced with economic crises and tight resource 
constraints often do the reverse: they look for ways to mollify foreign rivals 
(appeasement), “outsource” the demands of security other nations (buckpassing), 
or scale back foreign commitments and military expenditures (retrenchment). 
 Just as leaders have self-interested reasons to think in geopolitical terms, 
then, political self-interest explains why leaders think about grand strategy in 
domestic terms, too.26 When powerful elements within their party see little 
advantage in militarism, when playing the “security card” offers little electoral 
advantage and when fiscal constraints are tight, leaders face political hurdles to 
the mobilization of resources for investment in the military. While such leaders 
are just as sensitive to international threats as their militarist-minded counterparts, 
they have strong political incentives to find credible and effective strategies for 
achieving security that avoid placing a heavy burden on domestic resources. 
                                                 
25 Levy, ‘The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique’, in Manus I. Mildarsky ( 
ed.), Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin, Hyman, 1989), pp. 259-88. 
26 One limitation of our approach is that it does not capture the full complexity of 
interactive effects whereby geopolitics shape party politics and domestic politics 
affects the external environment (or perceptions of it). Nevertheless, it would be 
wrong to overstate the co-constituency of the two. Partisan preferences are almost 
always rooted in endogenous social, economic and political forces, while 
geopolitics cannot be reduced to the sum of partisan alignments at home and 
abroad. 
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Appeasement as statecraft 
 We now have the pieces in place to predict when leaders will find it 
politically advantageous to adopt cost-minimizing strategies like appeasement 
(see table 1).27 For these leaders security is scarce. They cannot afford to discount 
the risk of strategic failure and so must find ways to reduce the nation’s 
vulnerability to potential military attack, economic coercion, and political 
intimidation. For these same leaders, however, the high cost of investing in 
military power is an issue. Their party or coalition prefers butter to guns; key 
constituencies and voters are reluctant to prioritize foreign policies that threaten 
domestic consumption or require increased taxes. Whereas the leaders of other 
parties might be able to implement strategies of internal balancing, appeasers fall 
into the category (scenario III in Table 1) of leaders who cannot; they are leaders 
under great pressure to invest at home. Under such circumstances, there is a 
pressing need to find strategies that promise satisfactory levels of external 
security but which will not jeopardize important domestic objectives. Leaders are 
thus inclined to rely on grand strategies that do not place a heavy burden on 
domestic resources and that attach greater weight to diplomacy than force, yet still 
                                                 
27 Due to limitations of space we describe only the combination of international 
domestic conditions that lead statesmen to favor cost-minimizing strategies like 
appeasement (scenario III in Table 1). For a detailed discussion of the variations 
in the types of grand strategy in Table 1 (e.g., balancing , expansionism), and the 
international and domestic conditions that produce them, see Trubowitz, Politics 
and Strategy, pp. 31-43. 
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offer the prospect of success in terms of achieving an acceptable level of external 
security (or at least the avoidance of humiliation, capitulation, or war). In short, 
appeasers are leaders who need security on the cheap. 
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
British appeasement in the 1930s 
 In this section, we test the argument through an analysis of British grand 
strategy before World War II.28  Overall, we show that, as prime minister in the 
late 1930s, Neville Chamberlain confronted the timeless tradeoff delineated 
above: how to ensure external security with limited means. Chamberlain viewed 
Hitler’s ambitions and diplomacy with wariness and misgivings. He could not 
afford the political risk of ignoring the danger. At the same time, domestic politics 
created strong pressure to find an inexpensive way to reduce the nation’s strategic 
exposure. As we show, Chamberlain led a party eager to avoid war and to devote 
scarce government resources to domestic ends. Appeasement thus emerged as the 
                                                 
28 We contribute to a growing literature that explains grand strategy during this 
period with reference to both domestic and international politics, although our 
argument differs in important ways from this (mostly neoclassical realist) work.  
See, for example, Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political 
Constraints on the Balance on Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006); and Taliaferro, Ripsman and Lobell (eds), The Challenge of Grand 
Strategy. For a political economy (domestic politics) explanation of British 
appeasement in the 1930s, see Anievas, ‘The International Political Economy of 
Appeasement’. 
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favored strategy for dealing with the rise of Germany as a hard-headed and 
calculated response to an unforgiving set of political circumstances. 
Geopolitics: the German problem 
 Realist accounts of the period make clear that Chamberlain had little 
geopolitical slack and that this fact was not lost on him.29 As early as 1934, 
Chamberlain had singled out Germany as “the enemy to watch.”30 Part of this 
intuition had to do with Chamberlain’s private misgivings about the Nazi regime. 
Worries about British vulnerability to strategic bombing were another factor.31 
More fundamentally though, it had to do with the dangers that a general European 
war posed to Britain’s strategic position and economic welfare. With Britain’s 
economy and finances still reeling from World War I and the Great Depression, 
Chamberlain worried that a costly war to contain German expansion – even if 
fought alongside allies – could easily come at the price of Britain’s empire, status 
as a leading Great Power,32 domestic standards of living and the Conservative 
Party’s electoral majority. 
 The prevailing geopolitical landscape meant that the risk of entanglement 
in a European conflagration was not to be taken lightly. For one thing, France’s 
                                                 
29 Layne, ‘Security Studies’, pp. 404-5; Ripsman and Levy, ‘Wishful Thinking’, 
pp. 159-63; Schweller, Unanswered Threats, p. 73. 
30 Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 253. 
31 See Frank McDonough, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British 
Road to War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p. 35.  
32 Andrew David Stedman, Alternatives to Appeasement: Neville Chamberlain 
and Hitler’s Germany (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 157-58. 
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attachment to the Versailles and Locarno settlements put it on a collision course 
with German revisionism. The Central and Eastern European nations that directly 
stood to lose from German revanchism were also staunchly status quo.33 
Chamberlain recognized that a diplomatic crisis involving this status quo bloc of 
nations on Germany’s borders could easily draw Britain into a war not of its own 
choosing.34 The desire to avoid sparking a war with Germany was thus a major 
national security objective for Chamberlain.  This helps to explain why 
Chamberlain found it difficult to implement a successful strategy of external 
balancing to deal with the German threat: instead of deterring war, extending 
security guarantees to other countries risked emboldening hardliners in foreign 
capitals who might provoke Hitler and thus make war more likely. 
 Other potential allies against Germany came with their own risks. Italy 
had drifted towards Berlin and Tokyo in the wake of its invasion of Abyssinia, 
                                                 
33 While the Locarno Treaties (1925) reaffirmed the Versailles settlement’s 
demarcation of borders in Western Europe, they left unanswered the question of 
Eastern European borders, heightening fears in Eastern European capitals that 
Germany’s eastward expansion was tacitly approved by the western powers. 
34 Just weeks before Munich, Chamberlain explained to his sister: “I am satisfied 
that we should be wrong to allow the most vital decision that any country could 
take, the decision as to peace or war, to pass out of our hands into those of the 
ruler of another country and a lunatic at that.” Robert Self (ed.), The Neville 
Chamberlain Diary Letters Volume 4: The Downing Street Years, 1934-1940 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 344. On Chamberlain’s reluctance to extend 
security guarantees to the Netherlands, see Roger Parkinson, Peace for Our Time: 
Munich to Dunkirk – The Inside Story (New York: MacKay, 1972), pp. 93-7. On 
restraining the Poles over Danzig, see A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second 
World War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961), pp. 221-22. On Chamberlain’s 
need to restrain allies more generally, see Stedman, Alternatives, pp. 156-57. 
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and the price that Mussolini demanded for realigning Rome’s interests with 
London’s was too high for any British leader to condone.35 For its part, the U.S. 
was absent from European affairs for most of the 1930s, and Chamberlain was 
loath to cede global influence to the Americans as the price of their assistance.36 
Even the Dominions were reluctant to commit to opposing Hitler unless 
diplomacy had run its course.37 A short-lived form of external balancing against 
Germany had been attempted in 1934 via the so-called “Stresa Front” of Britain, 
France and Italy. However, when German expansionism was at its pre-war height 
in 1938 and 1939, the window for effective external balancing appeared closed; 
potential allies were thin on the ground, often torn between balancing against and 
bandwagoning with Germany, and Chamberlain himself was hamstrung by the 
need to contain Hitler but also restrain those who would provoke him. 
 The (im)possibility of bringing the Soviet Union into a Grand Alliance 
against Germany warrants particular investigation, not only because it was 
mooted at the time but also because its failure to materialize is used as evidence 
by some scholars that Britain’s political class was driven to appease Germany 
                                                 
35 Following Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain reached out to 
Mussolini but was informed that Italy would only intercede on Britian’s behalf 
conditional on territorial concessions from France. Self, Diary Letters, p. 394 fn 
53. 
36 C.A. Macdonald, The United States, Britain and Appeasement (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1981).  
37 Ritchie Ovendale, ‘Appeasement’ and the English-Speaking World: Britain, the 
United States, the Dominions and the Policy of ‘Appeasement’, 1937-1939 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1975). 
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because of ideology rather than orthodox military-security calculations.38  In fact, 
the failure of an Anglo-Soviet alliance to emerge only highlights the inauspicious 
security environment within which Chamberlain was operating. Moscow was 
(with some justification) seen as an unreliable partner by diplomats in London, 
with contemporaries accusing the Soviets of negotiating in bad faith and 
consistently upping the price of their involvement in any anti-Nazi pact. The 
Soviet leadership, of course, had good reasons to mistrust Britain; after all, British 
troops had, in Churchill’s words, fought to “strangle at birth” the Russian 
revolutionary regime during 1918-1920. Furthermore, an alliance involving the 
Soviet Union was impracticable given that Poland, whose cooperation would be 
essential to forcing Germany to fight a war on two fronts, refused to countenance 
Soviet troops on its territory.39 
 The explanation that Chamberlain failed to conclude an alliance with 
Moscow because of elite anti-communism misses these harsh geopolitical 
realities. Furthermore, if Britain’s elite was motivated by a singular desire to 
defeat communism at home and abroad, why not cultivate greater ties of 
friendship with Germany and the other fascist powers instead of pursuing the 
                                                 
38 Halperin, War and Social Change; Anievas, ‘The International Political 
Economy of Appeasement.’ 
39 Stedman, Alternatives, pp. 122, 150-53, 159-60.  It is worth noting, however, 
that London did not bring the full force of British diplomacy to bear to force the 
Poles to accept Soviet war assistance.  Anievas, ‘The International Political 
Economy of Appeasement’. 
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appeasement and limited deterrence? It also overstates the case to suggest that 
Chamberlain’s actions amounted to an historic renunication of Britain’s timeless 
role of special “balancer.”40 In fact, Chamberlain’s policies vis-à-vis Germany 
were precisely aimed at maintaing a balance power in Europe—albeit through the 
redress of German grievances and by avoiding measures that would swell the 
Soviet Union’s influence. Again, the point for Chamberlain was not to find allies 
to win a war with Germany (if war had been thought inevitable then an alliance 
with the Soviet Union might well have materialized) but rather to find a 
diplomatic settlement that would maintain a stable peace. Last, domestic 
(including elite) support for alliance with Moscow exploded following Hitler’s 
invasion of Czechoslovakia (up to 87 percent of the public was in favor of an 
alliance with Moscow in April 1939) and Chamberlain himself did sanction 
overtures towards his end.41 In the event, no alliance was forthcoming—not 
because of British indifference but because of the very real geopolitical 
complexities described above. 
 Overall, geopolitical slack was scarce for Chamberlain in the late 1930s: 
Germany presented a very real threat to British national security and the overall 
stability of Europe, and potential allies were few and far between. Partly as a 
response to this geopolitical environment, Chamberlain turned to diplomacy as a 
                                                 
40 Halperin, War and Social Change, p. 200. 
41 Stedman, Alternatives, pp. 134, 156. 
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means to pacify Germany. Geopolitics alone, however, cannot fully explain why 
Chamberlain sought security through appeasement, or why he did not select an 
alternative strategy to reduce the nation’s strategic exposure, such as building up 
Britain’s military (internal balancing). In weighing his options, Chamberlain had 
to consider how geopolitical choices would affect his domestic priorities. 
Rearmament versus recovery 
 Though he is mostly remembered today for his foreign policy, 
Chamberlain himself viewed his succession to prime minister as the capstone to a 
long career as a domestic reformer.42 In local politics and on the national stage, 
Chamberlain had consistently taken a keen interest in matters of public health, 
housing, social insurance and reform of local government. Even as prime minister 
during tempestuous times, Chamberlain orchestrated domestic legislation on 
social insurance, factory working conditions, housing, and physical training. As 
late as the outbreak of war itself, Chamberlain was developing policy on London 
transport and masterminding the creation of a vast government agency to 
coordinate economic activity.43  These domestic achievements were central to 
Chamberlain’s success as a politician, as well as to the success of his party.  
                                                 
42 “Almost certainly,” writes historian David Dutton, “Chamberlain himself 
would have wished to be remembered as a domestic reformer. Had his career been 
cut short at any time before 1937 this is almost certainly how things would have 
turned out.” David Dutton, Neville Chamberlain (London: Arnold, 2001), p. 192. 
43 Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 307. 
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 First and foremost, Chamberlain understood that the Conservative Party’s 
fortunes depended upon the success of its economic recovery plans.44 For 
Chamberlain, this meant adhering to financial orthodoxies. It is in this context that 
Chamberlain insisted “defence spending [be] confined to priorities, [be] within 
manageable limits and…above all [be] rendered acceptable to a highly sensitive 
public opinion,”45 caveats that translated into considerable limits on defense 
spending. Cutting existing government expenditure to pay for armaments was 
deemed inappropriate because of “the risk of resulting social unrest.”46 Increased 
taxes were also ruled out as anti-business and anti-recovery, with one Treasury 
official in 1935 professing the country to be “taxed to full capacity.”47 In the 
event, Chamberlain agreed in 1937 to a £400 million loan to finance rearmament 
but additional borrowing was anathema to the generally accepted orthodoxy of 
achieving a balanced budget. Officials further worried that inflation-through-
borrowing would create unrest among wage earners, threatening not only 
                                                 
44 For good overviews of Chamberlain’s views of the economy, see; George C. 
Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic 
Press, 1979); and Robert Paul Shay, British Rearmament in the Thirties 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
45 Smart, Neville Chamberlain, p. 204. 
46 Shay, British Rearmament, p. 160; Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter-War Economy: 
Britain, 1919-1939 (London: Batsford, 1970), p. 302. The cabinet formally agreed 
in March 1936 that rearmament must “be carried out without restriction on social 
services.”  See Peden, British Rearmament, p. 89. 
47 Peden, British Rearmament, 74. See also Shay, British Rearmament, p. 160: “It 
was universally agreed that any effort to rely on taxation to finance rearmament 
would lead the nation straight back into the depression.” 
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“national security, but [also] the whole social order.”48 What is more, 
Chamberlain’s advisers cautioned that employing construction firms to build new 
munitions factories would reduce private housing construction, one of the flagship 
engines of economic recovery,49 while also damaging Britain’s balance of trade.50 
 The upshot was that a foreign policy of internal balancing would be a very 
tough sell domestically and highly risky to the Conservatives. To be sure, 
Chamberlain was not averse to military spending per se. Indeed, he presided over 
increases in defense spending during both his tenure as Chancellor (1931-1937) 
and as Prime Minister. Rather, for Chamberlain the challenge was to pursue 
                                                 
48 Shay, British Rearmament, p. 161. This point is stressed in Halperin, War and 
Social Change and Anievas, ‘The International Political Economy of 
Appeasement’. We agree that resolve to preserve the stability of British society 
was a driving force behind Chamberlain’s desire for peace. Nevertheless, anti-
communism alone is underdetermining. Unfettered anti-communist sentiment 
would likely have pushed Britain into an alliance with Germany, as indeed some 
on the far-right advocated in the 1930s, instead of the stand-offish, mutually 
suspicious relationship that actually characterized the era of appeasement. 
49 Peden, British Rearmament, pp. 83-4, 93. On the importance of housing to 
Britain’s economic recovery, see Newton, Profits of Peace, pp. 45-6; and H.W. 
Richardson, Economy Recovery in Britain, 1932-9 (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1967), pp. 153-81. In any case, acute labor shortages made extensive 
rearmament impracticable in many areas. Peden, British Rearmament, pp. 81-2. 
50 Officials feared that lucrative defense contracts would draw British industry’s 
attention away from overseas markets, worsening Britain’s balance of trade—
indeed, doubly so, given that rearmament itself would require an increase in 
imported raw materials. On the connection between defense spending and foreign 
trade, see Peden, British Rearmament, pp. 63, 85-5. See also Layne, ‘Security 
Studies’, pp. 406-7. 
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rearmament in an affordable and politically acceptable way.51 This meant 
avoiding moves that might threaten needed domestic reforms (the guns-versus-
butter trade-off) or that might jeopardize economic recovery. The result was a 
“twin” foreign policy of deterrence and détente, with limited rearmament (mostly 
in terms of air and naval forces) adopted as a complement to diplomacy - not, as 
some would have it, an alternative.52   
The electoral connection 
Partisan and electoral incentives to pursue appeasement reinforced 
economic ones. The Conservatives’ primary constituencies were the landed 
aristocracy and the trade and finance sectors – sectors that made up what P.J. Cain 
and A.G. Hopkins famously called the “gentlemanly capitalists.”53 These sectors 
were heavily invested in British imperialism and while they pressured 
Chamberlain to give pride of place to protecting the empire, they preferred low-
                                                 
51 According to Nick Smart, “Provided defence spending was confined to 
priorities, was kept within manageable limits and was above all rendered 
acceptable to a highly sensitive public opinion, he [Chamberlain] was for it.”  
Smart, Neville Chamberlain, p. 204. 
52 See, for example, Newton, Profits of Peace, p. 73; Layne, ‘Security Studies’, p. 
402. As Peden notes, rearmament was not pursued in “preparation for war at any 
specific date,” but for the purposes of deterring a German attack against Britain. 
Peden, British Rearmament, p. 65. “What you want,” Chamberlain explained in 
1939, “are defensive forces sufficiently strong to make it impossible for the other 
side to win except at such a cost as to make it not worth while [sic].”  Daniel 
Hucker, Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and France 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 186. 
53 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000 2nd Edition 
(Harlow: Pearson, 2002). 
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cost methods of doing so.54 These same sectors, especially commerce, had a direct 
stake in maintaining peace and economic cooperation with Germany. As Scott 
Newton observes, “some of the most important commercial interests at the heart 
of the City were dependent on détente with Germany.”55 The Conservative core’s 
strong preferences for good working relations with Germany constituted an 
“institutional bias” against conflict (or, indeed, disengagement). Chamberlain 
himself noted this inextricable link between politics and economics in a speech to 
Parliament, insisting that 
 
 “I do not think it is possible entirely to separate economic from political 
conditions…  [W]hile undoubtedly the economic problem must always be 
an important factor in any endeavour to bring about a better state of things 
in Europe, it is much more likely to receive favourable consideration if it 
has been preceded by some easing of political tension beforehand.”56 
 
Electoral exigencies strongly favored maintaining peaceful relations with 
Germany. At least since the 1918 Representation of the People Act, winning 
                                                 
54 Narizny, Political Economy, pp. 159-64, 168-71. The gentlemanly capitalists’ 
commitment to fiscal orthodoxy also lent tacit support to the rationing of defense 
spending. See Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, pp. 448-49, 479-81.  
55 Newton continues: “the material interests of the most powerful and prestigious 
part of the City were wrapped up with the maintenance of [Anglo-German 
relations],” providing “a rationale for economic détente which was not motivated 
by fear” but by interest. Newton, Profits of Peace, p. 58. See also David Kaiser, 
Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980); Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 482. 




working class votes had become essential for returning the Conservative Party to 
office.57 Because of Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system, winning 
parliamentary elections – then as now – was not a question of national vote share 
but of winning in particular “battleground” seats.58 For the Conservatives, this 
meant reaching out beyond their traditional base and winning over predominantly 
working class seats. Placating the working class pushed Chamberlain towards 
appeasement as a strategy in several ways. Not least of all, it meant maintaining 
Conservative support for social spending (“butter”).59 Because working class 
voters tended to oppose war and profiteering by the arms industry, and strongly 
supported collective security and the League of Nations, it also meant avoiding 
foreign policies that might leave the Conservatives open to charges of militarism 
                                                 
57 The 1918 Act tripled the size of the British electorate, allowing all males and 
women over the age of 30 to vote. On the importance of the working class vote to 
the Conservatives, see Andrew J. Taylor, ‘Stanley Baldwin, Heresthetics and the 
Realignment of British Politics’, British Journal of Political Science, 35:3 (2005), 
pp. 429-63; Philip Williamson, ‘‘Safety First’: Baldwin, the Conservative Party, 
and the 1929 General Election’, Historical Journal, 25:2 (1982), pp. 385-409; and 
B.J.C. McKercher, ‘National Security and Imperial Defence: British Grand 
Strategy and Appeasement, 1930-1939’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 19:3 (2008), p. 
395. 
58 In 1922 the Conservatives won 344 seats in the House of Commons (a 
majority) on 38.5 percent of the nation vote, but in the following year’s general 
election they were reduced to 258 seats with 38 percent. 
59 John Ramsden, An Appetite for Power: A History of the Conservative Party 
Since 1830 (London: HarperCollins, 1998), pp. 261, 288-89, 291. 
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and or war-mongering.60 See table 2 for a breakdown of the Conservatives’ 
electoral coalition. 
Experience and basic electoral arithmetic showed that the Conservatives 
could offend working class sensibilities only at great electoral risk.61 Even a clean 
sweep of seats in London and the South of England (where working class 
preferences tended to reflect those of the export and financial services sectors) 
was not enough to deliver a parliamentary majority for the Conservative Party.62 
As such, Chamberlain could not neglect voters in the North of England and in 
Wales, where the contintental-oriented coal mining and manufacturing industries 
prevailed and working class voters were staunchly internationalist in outlook. Still 
less could Chamberlain ignore the working class’s general opposition to 
rearmament or its faith in the League of Nations.63 As tables 3 and 4 illustrate, 
even small movements in the popular vote could spell electoral disaster for the 
                                                 
60 Kennedy, Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British 
External Policy, 1865-1980 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 240-45. As 
Daniel Hucker notes, Chamberlain firmly believed (and justifiably so) that 
working class sentiment was behind his policy of appeasement. See Hucker, 
Public Opinion, pp. 30-41. 
61 This is one of the lessons that Chamberlain and other Conservatives took from 
the party’s punishing defeats in 1923 and 1929. See Ramsden, Appetite for 
Power, p. 272.  
62 Those regions contained 209 seats, excluding university seats, while 308 seats 
were needed for a majority. 
63 On the regional breakdown of the British electorate, see J.P.D. Dunbabin, 
‘British Elections in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, a Regional 
Approach’, English Historical Review 95:375 (1980), pp. 241-267; and Narizny, 
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Conservatives during the inter-war period. Strong electoral performances in 
manufacturing regions like the North of England and the Midlands were essential 
to delivering parliamentary majorities. Towards this end, reform—not 
rearmament—was the order of the day. As John Ramsden comments, 
Chamberlain’s domestic reforms “provided [Conservative] MPs with a solid diet 
of policy achievements to take even to their working-class electors when seeking 
a renewal of their support.”64 By contrast, policies that risked being perceived as 
militaristic would have had the very opposite effect. 
 
[Tables 2-4 about here] 
 
Innenpolitik characterizations of the Conservatives’ interwar base as 
constituting a City-Treasury-Bank nexus are thus accurate but incomplete.65 Such 
a nexus existed, but alone it was not strong enough to deliver the parliamentary 
majorities necessary to wield power and shut out the Labour Party. In addition to 
its gentlemanly capitalist core, then, the Conservatives needed the support of large 
numbers of middle and working class voters. Among other things, this meant a 
foreign policy that did not require cuts to social spending, taxes hikes, or 
                                                 
64 Ramsden, Appetite for Power, p. 288. 
65 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 426; Newton, Profits of Peace, p. 4; 
Halperin, War and Social Change; Anievas, ‘International Political Economy of 
Appeasement’. 
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increases in government borrowing. Appeasement as a grand strategy met all of 
these requirements.   
The fact that Chamberlain’s domestic opponents could not agree on an 
alternative to appeasement only made the Prime Minister’s choice easier. Rather 
than serving as a constraint, this elite split actually empowered Chamberlain.66 
The Labour Party opposed appeasement and arms manufacturing while 
simultaneously supporting a pact with the Soviet Union and collective security 
under the auspices of the League of Nations—impractical solutions both. 
Churchill, too, supported a “Grand Alliance” with the Soviets. Other so-called 
anti-appeasers in the Conservative ranks were actually very much in the 
appeasement camp, even if they proposed appeasing Japan or Italy instead of 
Germany.67 Proponents of other alternatives to appeasement also existed, 
including isolationists, outright pacifists and those calling for a pre-emptive war 
against Germany.68 Nevertheless, the case for dropping appeasement was not 
effectively put to Parliament or to the British people. 
In the absence of a clear alternative, appeasement’s opponents faced an 
uphill battle when it came to public sentiment. The most systematic account of 
                                                 
66 See Stedman, Alternatives. 
67 As Gustav Schmidt notes, “neither Churchill nor Eden nor the Labour 
Opposition offered a genuine alternative to appeasement. They, too, spoke in 
favour of appeasement on a number of issues; for example, in respect of Italy and 
Japan.” Gustav Schmidt, The Politics and Economics of Appeasement: British 
Foreign Policy in the 1930s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 9-10.   
68 Stedman, Alternatives. 
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public opinion during the period suggests that Chamberlain’s efforts to avoid war 
enjoyed broad public support and, importantly, that he was aware of this fact. 
Using newspaper editorials as his “paramount” gauge of public opinion,69 
Chamberlain had no reason to suspect that there would be electoral gains from 
ramping up rearmament above the level that he had deemed to be affordable. On 
the contrary, there was much to expect from a policy aimed at avoiding war.70 In 
1935, 11 million voters (38 percent of Britain’s adult population) had taken part in 
the so-called Peace Ballot, creating a significant impression among the elite that 
the British public was in favor of collective security and in opposition to arms 
manufacturing.71 Between 1935 and 1939, Chamberlain saw little to change his 
mind on this point: in addition to a steady stream of newspaper editorials that 
broadly confirmed his reading of domestic politics, the fact that the British press 
and public lined up behind his decision in September 1938 to cede the 
                                                 
69 Hucker, Public Opinion, p. 20. 
70 Indeed, after assessing public opinion to the best extent possible, Hucker 
broadly confirms Chamberlain’s judgement. Hucker, Public Opinion, pp. 30-41. 
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Sudetenland to Germany only buttressed Chamberlain’s perception that the public 
yearned for peace, not rearmament, and still less for war. 
Appeasement explained: To Munich and after 
 British leaders repeatedly acquiesced in Germany’s militarization and 
expansion during the 1930s, from the reintroduction of German conscription and 
the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, to the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland in 1936, to Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland in 
Czechoslovakia and even beyond. The strategy of appeasement reached its zenith 
with Neville Chamberlain as prime minister and principal architect of Britain’s 
grand strategy, with the Munich Pact of September 1938 generally regarded as 
being the high water mark of appeasement. For Chamberlain, appeasement meant 
continued diplomatic and economic ties with Germany and the reasonable redress 
of Germany’s security concerns and territorial grievances. Like Stanley Baldwin 
before him, Chamberlain was “striving to preserve the peace of Europe, not to 
win a war.”72 As the foregoing discussion has detailed, this policy of appeasement 
was firmly rooted in a specific configuration of international and domestic 
incentives. 
Consideration of the Munich Pact of 1938, the centerpiece of 
Chamberlain’s efforts to appease Hitler, helps to flesh out Chamberlain’s calculus 
more fully.  Munich was the culmination of three visits to Germany by 
                                                 
72 Taylor, Origins, p. 227. 
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Chamberlain in September 1938, a diplomatic offensive to resolve the German-
Czechoslovak crisis known to British officials as “Plan Z.”73 The proximate cause 
of the crisis was Sudeten German demands, actively supported by Hitler, that the 
region be put under German control. Chamberlain sought to avoid a situation 
whereby German intervention to “free” the Sudeten Germans would be met by 
French mobilization and, ultimately, British entanglement. The objective of Plan 
Z was to avert war by conciliating German demands. Chamberlain came away 
from the negotiations with Hitler convinced that he had not only prevented the 
outbreak of war, but also had hammered into place a “method of consultation” to 
resolve any future differences between between Britain and Germany.74 
Upon his return from Munich, Chamberlain was feted by crowds jubilant 
at the aversion of war. Chamberlain even “enjoyed the exceptional honour of 
joining the King and Queen on the balcony” of Buckingham Palace before a 
cheering throng.75 Newspaper coverage of Munich was effusive in its praise for 
Chamberlain; taking stock of British press’s responses to Munich, Daniel Hucker 
concludes that “there was little political profit in criticizing those who had 
                                                 
73 Plan Z was put into effect after earlier diplomatic initiatives had failed to obtain 
Czech submission to German demands. See David Faber, Munich, 1938: 
Appeasement and World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), p. 239; 
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prevented a war that nobody wanted.”76 Criticism in Parliament was largely 
reserved for specific terms of the Munich Agreement rather than the overall 
policy; detractors such as Labour’s Clement Attlee were at pains to associate 
themselves with the British public’s relief that war had been averted.77 
Support for the Munich Agreement was particularly strong within 
Chamberlain’s own party, the Prime Minister being “greeted by a standing 
ovation” as he entered the House of Commons on 3 October.78 True, a small yet 
determined group of Conservative MPs expressed reservations about the 
agreement, but such dissent “was to the greatest extent kept private,” with only a 
handful of MPs abstaining from a vote of support (which Chamberlain won 
handsomely).79 Those that did vocalize their dissent, including Duff Cooper and 
Churchill, were chastized by their local Conservative Associations, threatened 
with de-selection and the termination of their parliamentary careers: “the 
dissenters had to tread carefully if they wanted to stay in the party [and] keep their 
seats in the House of Commons.”80 Despite some parliamentary disunity, then, 
Conservative MPs and the party in the country were broadly supportive of 
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Chamberlain’s efforts – so much so, in fact, that some in the party, including the 
Prime Minister himself, even entertained the idea of an early election in order to 
“gain political capital from Chamberlain’s personal prestige.”81 Confident in his 
party’s backing for a brokered European peace (including concessions to 
Germany), Chamberlain had little cause to doubt his achievements or his 
judgment that militarism did not pay. 
That Chamberlain stuck to appeasement after Munich, consistently 
looking for diplomatic solutions to the crises of 1938-1939, is indicative of his 
belief that appeasement enjoyed robust popular support., which, coupled with 
Chamberlain’s emboldened authority within the Conservative Party, created a 
powerful incentive to ‘stay the course’ with a view to a securing a comfortable 
general election victory in 1939. When reports abounded in January 1939 that 
Germany was planning to invade the Netherlands, Chamberlain resisted any 
formal commitments that might “provoke rather than deter Hitler.”82  That same 
month, an Anglo-German Coal Agreement was signed to cement economic 
relations between the two countries in the hope that political relations might also 
be calmed.83 Even after the fall of Prague in March 1939, Chamberlain refused to 
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honor Britain’s security commitment to Czechoslovakia,84 and just weeks later the 
government did nothing in protest over Germany’s seizure of Memel from 
Lithuania.85 As late as the day after the invasion of Poland in September 1939, 
Chamberlain’s diary letters reveal that he was still actively weighing peace 
options.86 
Throughout, Chamberlain was convinced that his policy of appeasement 
could deliver lasting international security for Britain. He believed that revisions 
to the Versailles settlement could remove Germany’s legitimate grievances 
without the need for military action by either side. Chamberlain was persuaded 
that moderates within the Nazi regime could be relied upon to restrain Hitler if 
diplomatic concessions were forthcoming from the international community.87 Of 
course, “Chamberlain could only carry through his policy of German 
appeasement if Hitler co-operated,”88 and it is now clear that Hitler was no man of 
peace. Nevertheless, Chamberlain’s relinquishment of appeasement was as 
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Taylor, Origins, 271, 277; Self, Diary Letters, p. 443; Sidney Aster, 1939: The 
Making of the Second World War (London: Deutsch, 1973). 
87 See Lobell, “The Second Face of Security: Britain’s ‘Smart’ Appeasement 
Policy Towards Japan and Germany,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 
7:1 (2007), pp. 73-98; and MacDonald, ‘Economic Appeasement and the German 
“Moderates” 1937-1939: An introductory essay’, Past and Present, 56:1 (1972), 
pp. 105-35. 
88 Aster, 1939, p. 351.  On this broader point, see Rock, Appeasement. 
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gradual as it was reluctant: only when the international situation got 
overwhelmingly dangerous, driving public and parliamentary opinion to a boiling 
point over Nazi bellicosity, did Chamberlain consign appeasement to history and 
declare the country at war over the issue of Poland’s territorial integrity.89 
 Chamberlain was an appeaser because he needed security on the cheap. 
Chamberlain did not appease Hitler simply to free up capacity to balance against a 
more pressing foreign adversary, as conventional triage model of appeasement 
would propose, but rather as a way to neutralize Britain’s most pressing 
geopolitical threat. Nor was British appeasement the straightforward result of 
lobbying by narrow imperial interests—constituencies that, had they controlled 
British foreign policy, might even have made common cause with Germany. 
Instead, Chamberlain chose appeasement because of both geopolitical and 
domestic pressures. Internal balancing was at odds with Chamberlain’s domestic 
goals, while other cost-saving strategies on which Chamberlain might have relied, 
such as external balancing, buckpassing, or disengagement, were impractical or 
counterproductive, or both. Britain was too integrated into the European 
economy, and Chamberlain’s domestic agenda too dependent on stability on the 
Continent, to countenance a strategy of disengagement or isolationism. 
                                                 
89 For a good discussion of the shift in public opinion and its impact on British 
policy, see Richard Rosecrance and Zara Steiner, ‘British Grand Strategy and the 
Origins of World War II’, in Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds), The Domestic 
Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 124-
53. 
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Alternative explanations, domestic counterfactuals and what ifs 
 An analysis of the Chamberlain case offers opportunities to evaluate 
several alternative theories of appeasement. First, the realist arguments that 
appeasement occurs when states face multiple threats and thus need to engage in 
“triage” or else “buy time” to fight against an emerging challenger have difficulty 
accounting for Chamberlain’s policies. Britain did face multiple threats during the 
1930s, but chose to appease its most proximate threat instead of its more distant 
rivals, Italy and Japan.90 Meanwhile, our analysis shows that Chamberlain 
pursued rearmament to strengthen his diplomatic overtures towards Germany and 
withstand a German first strike, not to fight a balance of power-inspired war 
against Hitler. 
 Second, the Innenpolitik argument that appeasement was pursued in order 
to safeguard a particular form of social and economic order at home (that is, an 
elite-centered capitalist order) fails to explain why Chamberlain did not seek even 
closer ties with Germany than he actually did, for example by harnessing German 
power against the supposed Soviet menace. We can also rule out another 
commonplace Innenpolitik suggestion that public aversion to war explains 
                                                 
90 Although it might reasonably be charged that Italy and Japan posed the more 
formidable threat to Britain’s overseas empire, it is clear that decision-makers in 
London saw Germany as the chief threat, at least from 1934-1935 onwards and 
certainly by 1937.  On this point, see Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between 
the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 93, 93-6, 195, 218-19, 
243, 277, 280, 313-14, 316. 
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appeasement because the British public’s longstanding aversion to war was 
shattered after events like Kristallnacht in November 1938 and the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in March 1939, yet Chamberlain persisted with appeasement.91 
 Last, our analysis casts doubt on neoclassical realist arguments that see 
“under-balancing” strategies like appeasement as “lowest common denominator” 
responses to political polarization and gridlock or the availability of resources.92 
While the party system at Westminster was fragmented in the 1930s, the case 
should not be overstated: Chamberlain held a huge parliamentary majority 
throughout his premiership and could rely upon the obedience of the vast majority 
of Tory backbenchers right up until the Norwegian Debate of November 1940. 
The “elite dissensus” model fails to explain why Chamberlain clung to 
appeasement even after public and elite opinion solidified against appeasement of 
the Nazi regime following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.93 
                                                 
91 On this critical point, see Hucker, Public Opinion, pp. 83-4, 87. 
92 This argument is put forward in Schweller, Unanswered Threats, pp. 47-56, 69-
75. To summarize, Schweller argues that elite dissensus, social fragmentation, and 
regime weakness cause under-balancing, which, for present purposes, can be 
considered roughly synonymous with appeasement. 
93 Schweller’s case study of Britain in the 1930s ends in March 1939, when 
German forces invaded, occupied and dismembered Czechoslovakia. However, 
these events constitute a watershed moment after which it was not possible for 
Britain’s political class to “downgrade threat perception” as Schweller’s model 
would have it. The threat posed by Germany was manifest and well understood. 
Indeed, Chamberlain’s initial “muted” response to the invasion invited such a 
backlash that he was forced to adopt a tougher line on Germany and abandon the 
language of appeasement in public. Our model accounts for why appeasement 
persisted in form, even if not in rhetoric, for six months after the invasion of 
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 What would it have taken for Chamberlain to abandon appeasement in 
favor of a more active balancing strategy? We have argued that leaders are most 
likely to pursue appeasement when the demands for increased security conflict 
sharply with what they are trying to achieve domestically. In Chamberlain’s case, 
a higher-cost strategy such as internal balancing would only have been possible if 
domestic constraints had eased. In the event, they did not, and with geopolitical 
pressure remaining constant (indeed, worsening) over the period, appeasement 
remained the strategy of choice. 
 Yet while we cannot rerun history to answer these questions about 
Chamberlain, the evolution of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s strategy towards Nazi 
Germany provides a useful case in point for considering the counterfactual 
argument.94 To be sure, Germany’s threat to the United States was more to do 
                                                                                                                                     
Czechoslovakia. See Schweller, Unanswered Threats, p. 75; Hucker, Public 
Opinion, pp. 126-28, 131-34; and Parkinson, Peace for Our Time, p. 116.  
94 The U.S. case is particularly appropriate for our purposes because the American 
and British political systems place comparable electoral demands on their leaders. 
In democracies like the Britain and U.S., leaders must respond to geopolitical 
pressures while simultaneously competing to secure the political backing of not 
only partisans but also a decisive slice of the national electorate.  As industrial 
democracies with strongly competitive multi-party system, elected leaders are 
sensitive to the distributional consequences of foreign policy and to the trade-offs 
between investing in military power (guns) and domestic consumption (butter).  
We are not the first to highlight the significance of such comparisons between the 
U.S. and Britain for international relations theory.  See, for example, Waltz, 
Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1967) and Narizny, Political Economy. 
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with trade and economics than military concerns. 95 Nevertheless, strategists in the 
U.S. did fear that technological advances (especially in air warfare) would make 
the western hemisphere vulnerable to a Germany hegemonic in Europe, and even 
harbored suspicions of German designs on South America. Like Chamberlain, 
Roosevelt initially favored diplomatic efforts to conciliate Hitler. Between 1936 
and 1938, appeasement ran “like a leitmotif” though U.S. grand strategy.96 This 
was clearest in Roosevelt’s consideration of a peace initiative known as the 
Welles Plan, but it was also evident in a series of back-channel diplomatic 
missions that sought to address long-standing Germany grievances, split the 
emerging Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, and generally reduce the risk of war. By 
1939, however, FDR had abandoned appeasement in favor of an “offshore 
balancing” strategy. 97 Roosevelt took steps, sometimes in secret, to shore up 
Britain’s defense and ratchet up pressure on Germany. The United States quickly 
                                                 
95 This section draws heavily on Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy, pp. 64-74; see 
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97 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 237, 252-57.  See also 
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became the “arsenal of democracy” and Britain became America’s first line of 
defense. 
 Why did Roosevelt opt for balancing when Chamberlain did not? Realist 
explanations cannot account for the difference. After all, the geopolitical threat 
posed by Germany was less immediate for the U.S. than it was for Britain; if 
threat were the decisive factor, Chamberlain would have reversed course before 
Roosevelt. FDR even moved away from appeasement as the level of external 
threat intensified (i.e., after the Czech Crisis) rather than embracing appeasement 
as the strategic triage model would predict. Strictly Innenpolitik explanations also 
cannot account for the difference. While some Democratic constituencies (e.g., 
southern planters; Wall Street bankers) favored a more vigorous response to Nazi 
Germany, Democratic interests (e.g., organized labor; western progressives) that 
were closely aligned with Roosevelt’s New Deal reformist agenda opposed 
intervention in the European crisis. Like Chamberlain, Roosevelt had to contend 
with popular anti-war sentiment. Mass revulsion to the horrors of World War I 
may not have been as prevalent in the U.S. as in Europe, but public opinion in the 
U.S. was generally opposed to involvement in European affairs during the 1930s. 
 In Roosevelt’s case, what tipped the scales toward balancing was a shift in 
the Democratic Party’s preferences in the guns versus butter tradeoff (see table 5). 
As our model would predict, the triggering event was domestic, not international, 
in origin. In 1937 and 1938, the U.S. experienced one of the steepest economic 
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descents in its history.98 The so-called “Roosevelt Recession” was so severe that 
many – although not all – Democrats, including organized labor, came to see 
increased military spending as an attractive way to prime the pump and sustain 
voters’ confidence in the party. If domestic policies had failed to promote 
economic growth, perhaps a more vigorous – and expensive – foreign policy 
could step into the breach. Reflecting this domestic political shift, Roosevelt’s 
efforts to support Britain, expand the navy, and strengthen the army received 
overall Democratic backing from 1939 onward. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 When the New Deal failed to bring economic prosperity, appeasement for 
Roosevelt became counterproductive and expendable. To be sure, the easing of 
the guns-versus-butter trade-off in the U.S. did not make Roosevelt any less 
subject to the forces of external events than his British counterpart. But it did 
make it easier for Roosevelt to use those international events to move Democratic 
lawmakers his way, albeit in the guise of issuing “loans” to Britain, not outright 
war-making assistance. In contrast to the situation prevailing in the earlier years 
of his presidency, in 1939 Roosevelt found himself at the head of a party with 
                                                 
98 Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973), p. 272. 
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preferences for guns. Had Chamberlain’s Conservative Party come to see 
domestic advantage in investing in guns, our theory predicts that he too would 
have moved toward a more active balancing strategy to deal with Germany. 
 
Appeasement reconsidered  
 Few scholars still hold to the belief that Chamberlain’s efforts to appease 
Nazi Germany were shaped by naiveté or negligence. Chamberlain’s actions are 
now understood as hardheaded (rational) political calculations. Realists have 
allowed that appeasement was an understandable if imperfect strategy to cope 
with unforgiving international circumstances, while for Innenpolitik scholars 
Chamberlain’s policies were in response to powerful economic interests or other 
perceived domestic political exigencies. In this paper, we have argued that each of 
these approaches contributes valuable insight to understanding appeasement, but 
that each also incurs significant limitations by modeling a causal process in which 
explanatory variables emanate from just one level of analysis, whether 
international or domestic. Appeasement is not a singular response to multiple 
international threats; nor is it wholly attributable to domestic factors. Instead, 
appeasement is best understood as a strategy that cross-pressured leaders use to 
reconcile geopolitical and domestic imperatives. 
 Chamberlain was severely cross-pressured. He was under no illusion that 
Hitler’s intentions were peaceful or of limited political scope, yet at the same time 
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Chamberlain was not well positioned domestically to actively balance against 
Germany. Advocating active balancing before 1940 would likely have come at 
great personal political cost and also been unsuccessful. The resource constraints 
and partisan incentives facing Chamberlain also help to explain why appeasement 
cannot be explained as an attempt to “buy time” for balancing; domestic 
circumstances made an expensive balancing strategy unattainable in the long-term 
just as much as in the near-term. Instead, Chamberlain saw great advantages in 
relying on diplomacy to cope with the Nazi threat. Unlike his counterpart Franklin 
Roosevelt, whose domestic constraints ultimately proved less static, Chamberlain 
found it difficult to drop appeasement in favor of more expensive defensive 
strategies as conditions in Mitteleuropa worsened.  
Britain’s policies of the 1930s were not  produced by unique historical 
circumstances or the preferences of one individual. Rather, they may be explained 
by deductively applying a model of grand strategy choice that emphasizes how 
international and domestic pressures produce the grand strategy outcomes. Our 
approach thus underscores the value of individual level-of-analysis. That is, by 
centering the analysis on strategic choices (both political and geopolitical) and 
trade-offs faced by the political leader, it is possible to generate a coherent and 
parsimonious explanation for what has hitherto been regarded as a perplexing 
















Scenario I: Balancing 
 Internal balancing 
 Defensive war 
Scenario II: Expansionism 
 Expansionism 
 Imperialism 




Scenario III: Satisficing 
 Appeasement 
 External balancing 
 Buckpassing 
Scenario IV: Underextension 
 Retrenchment 
 Isolationism 





















































































Table 3. Seats won in House of Commons (percentage of popular vote in 
parantheses) 
























































Table 4. House of Commons seats won by the Conservatives, by region. 












 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1922* 90 82.5 62 70.5 73 48.6 53 60.6 13 18.3 5 17.1 
1923 60 57 40 48.4 53 34.5 44 49.5 14 19.7 4 11.4 
1924* 106 93 58 66.3 79 47.5 71 74.7 36 50.7 9 25.7 
1929 85 74.6 40 43.2 55 31.1 38 38.4 21 29.6 1 2.9 
1931* 93 90.4 72 81.1 129 79.1 73 77.8 45 67.6 6 17.1 
1935* 95 81 57 62.1 100 57.6 63 67.7 33 47.9 6 17.1 















Table 5. FDR’s changing political calculus 
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